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Abstract. For nearly six decades, fishery managers and policy makers have used bio-economic
models and methods as the foundation for their management schemes. These models and
methods are for the most part based on the deductive methodology of economics where central
assumptions are the metaphors of “equilibrium” and “bio-economic equilibrium”. Models based
on equilibrium theories are usually deterministic and static whereas the dynamics of the
operations and the markets are a meager part of the problem. Less attention has been offered
to inductive reasoning and modeling within the field of fishery management. The inductive
method of reasoning is often based on facts and actual observations within the industries,
a methodology widely used by engineers and the field of business administration. In this
paper, we introduce and integrate the concept of substitutability of economic resources into
a traditional bio-economic model. The results show that fishery management, which bases
decisions solely on traditional bio-economic models where the dynamics and consequences of
the operational decision processes of the industry are ignored, may reach decisions that work
in opposition to their intended one.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper will introduce a model using both the deductive methods ofbio-economics
and merge it with an inductive method from decision sciences or operational research.
The objective is to see if the two reasoning’s are compatible within the one model
and then explore what new information about fishery management the new approach
reveals.
∗ Bifröst University, Department of Business, ÍS-311 Borgarbyggd, Iceland, corresponding author,
e-mail: ingolfur@bifrost.is
∗∗ Reykjavik University, School of Science and Engineering, Menntavegi 1, 101 Reykjavik, Iceland,
e-mail: pallj@ru.is
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7494/dmms.2020.14.2.3944 131
132 I. Arnarson, P. Jensson
Usually the bio-economic approach is credited to Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955)
where they explore the relationships between fishing effort and the yield of a fish
stock. Since then, the fishery literature, as well as fishery management in general, has
focused on physical effort as a means to control the outtake from fishing stocks in
an effort to maintain or achieve a “bio-economic equilibrium”. In this context authors
and fishery managers have focused on optimizing fishing fleet capacity (capital stock)
were various technical specifications of the vessels are used as variables: Engine size,
fish hold capacity, vessel size and number, see Smith and Hanna (1990). Then, the
analyses have extended to include variables that can have indirect affects the capital
stock, such as: vessel licenses, taxes, fishing time, quotas, etc., see for example Ólafsson
et al. (2013).
It soon became evident that these models and methods were not sufficient as
a vehicle to achieve “bio-economic equilibrium”. It is therefore necessary to review and
redesign the methods and models.
The next stage in the development of these models and methods was the introduc-
tion of a multi-species approach, see for example Flåten (1988). Squires (1987a, 1987b)
and Squires and Kirkley (1991) studied the problem of regulating a “multiproduct”
industry, where the products are, in fact, fish species. In the bio-economic approach
the market dimension and multiple-product issue in the fishery management has been
discussed largely in terms of multiple species and different attributes of individual fish
stocks. The main focus has been on issues such as capital and various aspects of fleet
dimensions. Little attention has been offered to actual processing costs, market prices
and operational decisions facing economic agents in the industry. In this paper we
will integrate a new and important dimension of the real-life decision problems into
traditional bio-economic model and theoretically analyze the outcome.
Bjørndal et al. (2012) gives an overview of “Operation research in natural resource
industry”. In the chapter about fisheries, Bjørndal divides operation research in fisheries
into four areas: bio-economic modeling, technical efficiency, fishermen’s behavior and
multi criteria decisions. An interesting issue here is that the author classifies bio-
-economic modeling as an operational research methodology and the same definition
occurs in Árnason (2009).
These definitions are highly controversial because these models and methods have
their basis in neoclassical economics. The economics are usually classified as deductive
science, which starts out with a general statement, where assumptions such as the
metaphors of equilibrium and bio-economic equilibrium play a central role. Models
based on equilibrium theories are deductive and deterministic, where the dynamic
behavior of agents along the various markets of the value chain are disregarded, from
the fishing operations to the end consumers. Due to this over-simplified methodological
approach, the approach therefore has an inherent potential to lead managers and
decision makers to erratic conclusions and actions.
Fisheries can in large be characterized as a supply-driven as opposed to a demand-
-driven industry. This is due to environmental fluctuations that are beyond human
control and impossible to predict. Long term planning is therefore in many cases
unworkable and the decision on which product to produce and thus, what market
segment to choose, literally must be taken as the fish is hauled onboard. At the moment
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of decision, the prices are fixed, and the decision maker can have little or no impact
on them. The production decision has to be made momentarily in an ever-changing
decision environment (Jensson, 1988).
In his optimization process, the decision maker will therefore focus on minimizing
the cost of using available resources. In an ever-changing business environment, some
resources may be abundant at one moment in time but scarce at another. For example,
when landings are high and the raw material subject to decay, the agents will speed
up production by processing the catch into lower-priced products. As a rule of thumb,
the products that go faster through the production lines usually achieve lower market
prices per unit of weight. By increasing the quantity at lower prices, they attempt to
maintain an optimal net revenue in the given decision situation, see Arnarson and
Johnston (1991). This behavior and practice are well known in industrialized fisheries
(Iceland, Norway and the USA, for example).
Arnarson (2004) argues that given two resources, time and raw material for
instance, that are at least partly substitutes, the decision-making in an economic
process in time becomes relative. If the raw material (which we will call the reciprocal
resource) in a given economic process in time becomes scarce, relatively to the time
resource, the decision maker will tend to use less of it, and vice versa. The rationality
behind this is as follows: As a resource becomes scarcer, it will be relatively more
costly to use it in the process (compared to the reciprocal resources). In the case
of two resources, time and raw material (fish quotas for example), a decision maker
will predictably behave as follows: “When raw material is scarce the decision maker will
produce the products that will give him the lowest costs per time unit, i.e. he will use
more of the time resource. When time is scarce the economic agent will produce the
products that will give him lowest costs per raw material unit, i.e. he will use more
of raw material (quota)”, see Arnarson (2004). In general: If the cost of one resource
is high relative to the cost of the reciprocal resources, the decision maker will use
relatively less of the scarce and expensive resource. This behavioral pattern can be
seen in the fishing industries as described in Arnarson (2004), Arnarson and Jensson
(2006), and in the paragraph above.
Let us consider a fish species, taking cod as an example. A broad range of fresh,
salted and frozen products are produced from cod. The economic agent or a decision
maker for a particular harvesting and production process can usually choose between
several different products. Taking the production of fillets as an example, the main
stages are gutting, heading, filleting, skinning, trimming, packing and freezing. There
are a number of combinations leaving out one or more of these stages, leading to
a variety of products. By skipping processing stages like trimming, the production rate
can be increased (using relatively less of the time resource compared to the reciprocal
resources), usually at the cost of a lower price per unit product. The products can
then be sold to different market segments around the world, which usually have their
own product specification that in turn adds to the variety of the possible portfolio of
products.
The pattern described above can be seen in the Alaskan Pollock fishery, where
the carcass can be processed into a number of products (surimi and various types
of frozen products), requiring different input factors in the production process and
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sold to different market segments. In general, the sales price per unit for surimi is
lower than for fillets. A kilogram of surimi is, however, produced in one third of the
time that is required for one kilogram of fillets. Given that the fishery management of
Alaska is based the “Olympic Fishery Management System” the decision makers will
view the raw material (the fish) as “unlimited” relatively when compared to time in
their production processes. Surimi production lines are more technologically advanced
than fillet lines; they require more space and are usually more capital-intensive than
investments in filleting operations. We could therefore expect that long running,
relatively high market prices for surimi (compared to fillets) will contribute to capital
stuffing in the surimi operation and increase the harvesting capacity of the fleet. The
more labor-intensive filleting industry will lose ground and will get less of a share of
the total quota under the Olympic System Management.
The consequences in the long run would be lower sales price per kilogram (poorer
yield) and thus, less revenue for the total quota. Furthermore, we could expect lower
grade of employment due to the fact that the surimi operation is less labor insensitive.
Hence, cod for example, is not a single product in the economic process but a resource
that has a great number of attributes. These attributes can in turn act as substitutes
with other attributes of other resources within the process. To react to any changes
in the operational environment, the decision makers will usually have several choices.
Fishery management schemes will give the gridlines for the decision makers to operate
within, and these gridlines will shape the overall operation of the industry, from
investments in machines and facilities to products and market segments.
Árnason (2009) lists what he sees as number of well-defined objectives for fishery
management. Among these objectives are: Maximum sustainable yield of a fish stock,
conservation of fish stocks, generation of exports of and foreign exchange and maximum
economic rent. Then Árnason states that: “Clearly, not all of these objectives are
independent”. In his paper Árnason (2009) assumes (as most of the bio-economical
literature does) that there are dependencies between biomass of a stock and catch
effort of a fleet. We will also incorporate this assumption in our model along with the
inductive reasoning of decision sciences.
This paper proposes a modified fishery management bio-economic model that
includes possible variations in the market prices and, thus, possible impacts thereof.
In Section 3, we start with a simple harvesting model. To keep the presentation of our
ideas clear, we will keep the line of argumentation as simple as possible. We introduce
the operation- and market prices dimension to the harvesting model in Section 4 and
add it to the model, which is then solved in Section 5. Section 6 deals with the question
of fleet size. In Section 6 we give a practical illustration of the two model alternatives
presented in Section 3 and 4. In Section 7, we will provide some concluding remarks.
2. SIMPLE HARVESTING MODEL
We will base our analysis on a traditional Gordon-Schaefer model, see for example,
Hannesson (1974). The following analysis assume that the fleet is homogenous and
harvesting a single stock of fish. That is, an analysis of a single vessel type that
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represents the rest of the fleet. All agents are alike and behaving rationally. In the
following, ISK means Icelandic Kronur. To start, the following notation is introduced:
IQ: individual vessel quota (tons/year),
PC : maximum product and harvesting capacity for the vessel (tons/year),
n: number of vessels,
E: total annual effort for all vessels, operation time at sea (days),
Y : yield, or annual harvest, a function of E, Y (E) (tons/year),
P : sales prices for the finished products (ISK/ton),
CE : cost associated with each unit of effort (ISK/day at sea),
CF : cost associated with each vessel ISK/vessel/year),
CR: catch rate. Quantity per unit effort where CR(E) = Y (E)/E (tons/day),
e: upper limit on annual effort per vessel, i.e. maximum time at sea per year
for each vessel (days),
Z: net revenue, i.e., sales price*yield − costs (ISK/year).
As argued above, we assume that the decision makers in the economic processes
of the fisheries are price takers. The quantity of fish harvested and produced has no
impact on the market prices. We furthermore assume that the cost of fishing is a linear
function of E and n. We can make this assumption because the decision makers in the
fishing operation are going after a single species. The cost of harvesting will be the
same whatever product the respective species will be made into afterwards.
Then, the optimal effort is found by solving Model 1, assuming IQ ¬ PC :
Max Z = P · Y (E)− CF · n− CE · E (1)
E ¬ e · n (2)
IQ · n = Y (E) (3)
E,n, IQ ­ 0 n integer (4)
Let us also define the average catch rate, CR (average yield per unit effort) as
follows:
CR(E) = Y (E)/E (5)
When solving Model 1, it becomes evident that n should always be as small
as possible (Ex. (2)), and the individual quota IQ accordingly as large as possible
(Ex. (3)), that is
n = E/e in Ex. (2), and IQ = e · CR(E) (6)
Keeping this in mind, and again assuming that the catch rate will be the limiting
factor rather than production capacity, i.e. IQ ¬ PC , we get a well-known solution to
Model 1 (see for example Hannesson (1974) and Figure 1):
P · Y ′(E) = (CE + CF /e) => E1 and Z1 (and n1 and IQ1) (7)
Let us assume the scenario of an open access fishery in a state of equilibrium at
point a as shown in Figure 1, at an effort level E2, with n = E2/e vessels participating.
By using Model 1, we see that the optimal action is to reduce the number of vessels
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to n1 = E1/e (which is equal to maximum bio-economic yield), with each vessel
harvesting at an individual quota level equal to IQ1 = e · CR(E1).
Fig. 1. A Gordon-Schaefer Model, a bio-economic equilibrium. MSY: Maximum Sustainable
Yield, MEY: Maximum Economic Yield
3. ADDING OPERATIONS AND MARKET PRICES
As stated before we will keep the model as simple as possible and thus we repeat that
we assume that the fishing fleet is homogenous, i.e., all vessels are exactly equal. We
can express this as follows:
IQ · n = TAC,
where IQ stands for the individual quota, n for number of vessels in the fleet and
TAC for Total Allowable Catch (tons/year).
Treating the number of vessels in the fleet as a continuous variable, we will get
a continuous function. Given a continuous number of vessels, the IQ’s will also be
a continuous number.
To simplify our analysis, we assume that a single type of a factory trawler is
representative of a fishing industry. Furthermore we assume, based on Arnarson (2004)
and Arnarson and Jensson (2006), where a dynamic simulation of factory trawler
operation was used, that the natural fluctuations of input factors, such as catch
rates, will change the relative cost of available resources in the production process.
Fluctuation of the catch rates will for example change the value of that resource
relatively to the time resource. This effect can also be magnified by increasing the
amount of quota IQ allocated to each production unit. Arnarson and Jensson (2006)
showed that by simulating increase in a quota for given technical unit for a given
period, the average prices will gradually decline in a familiar concave manner or what
is commonly named the law of diminishing returns. We therefore assume that the
revenue as a function of increased vessel quota has a concave form. This is shown
in Figure 2, where the revenue R of a fishing industry (fishing vessel) is shown as
a function of quota IQ.
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Fig. 2. Revenue for an economic process in a fishing industry. Ph: highest price,
Pa: average price, Pl: lowest price, IQ: quota per unit, Pc: production capacity
In Figure 2 we have dropped the assumption of a single sales price P and introduced
a range of products and prices, such that
Ph – price for most valuable and, at the same time, most labor-intensive product. This
would be the only product produced in the case of a very small annual quota,
that is, relatively high cost of raw material compared to the time resource.
Pl – price for the least valuable, but “fastest”, product. This would be the only product
produced in the case of the maximum possible quota IQ = Pc, that is, relatively
high cost of the time resource compared to the cost raw material.
Pa – average price or actual sales price obtained by the process. The sales prices of
each product are constants as described above, however the product mix changes
with increasing IQ. See Arnarson, Jensson (2006).
The revenue function R(IQ) increases first marginally by Ph, but eventually the
marginal increase becomes zero, when the production capacity, Pc, of the industry is
reached.
From Figure 2, we can now deduct a general form for the average price Pa and
the average marginal price Pm at each quota level IQ, see Figure 3.
 
P h 
P a (IQ) 
P l 
IQ 







Fig. 3. Average and marginal price in an economic process. Ph: highest price, Pa: average
price, Pl: lowest price, IQ: quota per unit, Pc: production capacity
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Instead of our previous harvesting Model 1, we now have Model 2:
Max Z = Pa(IQ) · Y (E)− CF · n− CE · E (8)
E ¬ e · n (9)
IQ · n = Y (E) (10)
IQ ¬ Pc (11)
e · CR(E) ¬ Pc (12)
E,n, IQ ­ 0, n integer (13)
The main difference between Models 1 and 2 is that the average sales price is no
longer fixed, which is sufficient to cause n and IQ no longer to have trivial solutions,
as will be seen in the next section.
4. DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL QUOTA
To solve Model 2, we first eliminate n using (2.3), which gives
Max Z = [Pa(IQ)− CF /IQ] · Y (E)− CE · E (14)
IQ ¬ e · CR(E) (15)
IQ ¬ Pc (16)
E, IQ ­ 0 (17)
By relaxing Expression (15), i.e., the upper limit on IQ by using Expression (16),
Model 2 can be solved in two steps. We base our validation on relaxing the upper limit
of Expressions (15) on findings by Arnarson and Jensson (2006), where it was shown
by simulations that the maximum quota is not necessarily the optimum one, and also
on the calculations in Section 6 of this paper.
Step 1: Determine IQ = IQopt by maximizing the “net price”, Pn(IQ):
Max Pn(IQ) = [Pa(IQ)− CF /IQ] (18)
0 ¬ IQ ¬ Pc (19)
It is important to note that under this assumption (relaxation of Expressions (15)),
determining the optimal quota IQopt is independent of determining the effort E and
the harvest Y (E). This becomes obvious when scrutinizing this from the biological
point of view. The market prices cannot have an impact on the growth of wild species.
The determination of the MSY and therefore the quantity that is allowed to catch
from a given stock is totally independent of the sales prices.
Figure 4 shows how IQopt is found.
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Fig. 4. Optimal allocation of fishing quota. Ph: highest price, Pa: average price, Pl: lowest
price, IQ: quota per unit, Pc: production capacity, Pn: net price, IQopt: optimal
quota, CF : annual fixed operation cost per unit
The solution is derived from:
IQopt = SQRT (CF /(−P ′a(IQopt)) (20)
The second step of Model 2 is as follows:
Step 2: Determine the optimal effort E on the basis of IQopt and Pn(IQopt)
Max Z = Pn(IQopt) · Y (E)− CE · E (21)
E ­ 0 (22)
resulting in the solution
Pn(IQopt) · Y ′(E) = CE ⇒ Eopt (23)
To conclude this section, we emphasize that the question of how much quota
should be allocated to each vessel can be separated from the determination of the rate
of harvesting the fish stock, or in other words the determination of Total Allowable
Catch TAC. Determining the size of the individual quota for each factory trawler
only depends on the products, the market prices and the production attributes of the
products and the annual operation cost of the trawler CF .
5. DETERMINING FLEET SIZE
It can be shown that, when comparing the solutions to Model 1 and Model 2, the
following is true under reasonable assumptions (for the annotation Z1 and E1, see
Figure 1):
nopt > n, IQopt < IQ1 = Pc, Eopt > E1 and Zopt > Z1
Therefore, taking the concavity of the average price curve Pa(IQ) into account,
more vessels than earlier concluded from Model 1 should be operated with less than
the maximum quota each, resulting in a higher rate of harvesting and returns.
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Turning back to the scenario discussed at the end of Section 3, it should now
be clear that reducing the fleet to as few vessels as possible may not be an optimal
solution. It may even not be better than keeping the present number of vessels in
a given fishery unchanged but imposing individual quotas of appropriate size.
Let us briefly study the impact of quota allocations on fleet size, after the effort E
and total yield Y have been predetermined, i.e., TAC = Y (E) is given. By inserting
IQ = TAC/n into model (2), we get Model 3:
Max Z(n) = Pa(TAC/n) · TAC − CF · n (24)
n ­ 0 n integer (25)
Fig. 5. Gross revenue for an economic process. Ph: highest price, Pl: lowest price,
n: number of vessels, nopt: optimal vessel number, CF : annual fixed operation cost
per unit, Z: revenue, TAC: total allowable catch
For a fleet not capable of fishing their quota (IQ), usually the case for open
access fishery management systems or for a fleet which IQ is exactly at the technical
capacity, the agents will regard the fish resource as unlimited and therefore relatively
cheap, compared with other input factors (resources). Consequently, the time resource
becomes relatively scarce and the cost of the time resource becomes relatively high.
The decision makers in the fleet will therefore try to put as much as possible through
the production lines in the shortest possible time, resulting in producing the cheapest
and “fastest” products up to point n1. The slope of the revenue curve on this interval
(zero to n1) will therefore be linear. Increasing the fleet beyond n1 on Figure 5, will
increase the availability of the time resource, compared with other input resources
in the process, such as raw material (fish stock). The cost of time will gradually
decrease relatively to the cost of other resources, which in turn encourages agents to
use relatively more of it in the process. The result is the gradually increased production
of higher-priced products until the optimum is reached at nopt.
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6. AN ILLUSTRATION
The numbers in the following example are not from any particular fishing industry
but are adopted from Arnarson and Jensson (2004) and are purely for illustration.
Let us consider a fishing industry with the characteristics represented by the input
values in Table 1.
Table 1. Input values, Models 1 and 2
Parameter Symbol Value
Average sales price (Model 1) P 200 ISK/kg
Sales price, calculated (Model 2) P (IQ) =300− IQ2/450 ISK/kg
Cost associated with each vessel CF 10,000,000 ISK
Cost associated with unit of effort CE 50,000 ISK
Upper limit on annual effort e 300 days
Yield, calculated Y (E) =(1, 000, 000− (E − 1, 000)2) kg
The input values in Table 1 are then fed into Model 1 and Model 2, as defined in
the previous sections. The results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Output values, Model 1 and 2
Parameter Symbol Model 1 Model 2 Difference [%]
Gross rev (mill ISK) – 194 257 32
Cost (mill ISK) – 90 118 31
Net rev (mill ISK) Z 104 139 34
No vessels n 4.9 7.5 53
Effort (days) E 833 865 4
Quota (metric tons) IQ 200 131 −35
Price (average in ISK/kg) P (IQ) 200 262 31
Yield Y (E) = n · IQ 980 983 0
Catch rate CR(E) = Y/E 1.18 1.14 −3
Gross rev/vessel (mill ISK) – 39.6 34.3 −13
Net rev/vessel (mill ISK) Z/n 21.2 18.5 −13
As stated in Section 5, we would anticipate that the results from Model 2 would
show a higher harvesting rate than Model 1, as shown in Table 2, see E and Y (E).
Still, the harvesting rate is on the left side of the Maximum Sustainable Yield, MSY
(see Fig. 1). Furthermore, the number of vessels is larger in the model that has been
linked to sales prices than the model that is not (n in Table 2). Despite this, the net
revenue (Z) is 34% higher for Model 2 than the results from Model 1, and the gross
revenue from Model 2 is also higher (32%).
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Given that the agenda of a policy maker is to optimize the level of economic activity in
a given area or for a given society, the policy based on Model 1, which is the common
model for contemporary management schemes, is socio-economically less efficient than
a policy based on Model 2. In fact, as stated before, the policy based on Model 1 may
yield a result opposite to the intention of the policy maker. This discrepancy between
the socio-economic optimum and the optimum for individual firms (vessels) can be
deducted from Table 2. By choosing a policy based on Model 2 instead of Model 1,
the net revenue for each individual unit (fishing vessel) in the industry is reduced. The
results state clearly that there exists a socio-economic optimum and an optimum for
each individual vessel, and that these optima may not be compatible. In other words:
“Aggregated optimal revenue for individual economic agents may collide with optimal
economic revenue for a society”.
These findings can be of vital importance for fishery dependent areas and their
societies. We often find fishery dependent areas in remote and more sparsely populated
parts of the world, such as Northern Norway, Iceland, Newfoundland, and Alaska. The
areas were populated because of the presence of the fish resources and the communities
developed on basis of those same resources. Along with the fisheries, secondary and
tertiary industries developed but for the most part these areas are still dependent
on whether the fisheries prosper. The dependency of secondary and tertiary industries
on fisheries are amplified by the fact that opportunities for additional or new industries
are limited or non-existent in these remote areas. Poorly founded or faulty fishery
management decision can lead to the depopulation of these areas, which in turn can
have costly social implications along with the economic factors.
In Section 5 we concluded that the optimal quota per vessel from a given fish
stock could be determined separately from the determination of the biological yield
and fishing effort of that same stock. The optimal quota and the capacity of the
industry can be determined independently. The merging of these methods is therefore
not necessary and can in fact contribute to misleading and confusing fishery managers
in their decision process.
The objective of biological agents and economic agents differ. On the one hand,
they are concerned with optimizing the biomass of a given fish stock or to find the
Maximum Sustainable Yield. On the other hand, the objective of economic policies is
to allocate available resources between economic agents. Economic agents may then
have different objectives or policies. What is optimized, and how, also depends on the
ruling policies (laws and regulations) and who are allowed to participate. The very
nature of neo-classical modeling is that every decision maker in the model has the
same underlying objective or policies (equilibrium). We have proven that this does
not necessarily lead to optimal decision-making in a real-life environment.
Although the analysis in this paper is concentrated around fishery issues, it has
broader applications. We assume that the behavior of economic agents and their use
of resources as described in this paper are common, although they may be more
prominent within fisheries due to the high degree of variations in the operational
environment. We therefore anticipate that the scope of the suggested improvement
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of methods and models presented in this paper has a more general application, most
apparently within industries with renewable resources such as agriculture and forestry.
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